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Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Thu, 2007-11-29 at 18:24 -0500, Joshua Brindle wrote: > >> Stephen Smalley wrote: >> >>> On Thu, 2007-11-29 at 14:27 -0500, email@example.com wrote: >>> >>>
>>>> This is a reworking of the peersid capability patch Joshua sent out
>>>> a few weeks ago. This version requires added explicit declaration of
>>>> capabilities in the policy.
>>>> I've used the same strings that Paul's kernel diff used (there is
>>>> currently just a single capability).
>>>> Note that capability declarations are not limited to base.conf /
>>>> policy.conf as we would like to eventually get rid of the base vs. module
>>> Taking the union of the capabilities at link time seems worrisome to me. >>> I'd be more inclined to require equivalence or take the intersection. >>> >>> >>> >> I strongly disagree. My vision was to be able to add a capability to the >> policy by inserting a policy module that enables the capability (and has >> associated policy). Making them an intersection or equivalence would >> require one to update every single module just to add a capability (or >> at least update the base if it is considered authoritative, which I was >> also trying to avoid). >> > > Joshua - think about it. Let's say I write a policy module based on the > new peer checks, and my base module was written in terms of the old > network checks. Now I link them together and get a policy that tells > the kernel to use the new peer checks. Voila! My base policy breaks > horrendously. >
That is why I said the module being inserted would have the associated policy. I don't believe policyrep is going to have a concept of base so we'd just be delaying the inevitable by restricting it to base now. -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to firstname.lastname@example.org with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.