| Main Archive Page > Month Archives > selinux archives |
Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, 2007-11-29 at 18:24 -0500, Joshua Brindle wrote:
>
>> Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, 2007-11-29 at 14:27 -0500, tmiller@tresys.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> This is a reworking of the peersid capability patch Joshua sent out
>>>> a few weeks ago. This version requires added explicit declaration of
>>>> capabilities in the policy.
>>>>
>>>> I've used the same strings that Paul's kernel diff used (there is
>>>> currently just a single capability).
>>>>
>>>> Note that capability declarations are not limited to base.conf /
>>>> policy.conf as we would like to eventually get rid of the base vs. module
>>>> distinction.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Taking the union of the capabilities at link time seems worrisome to me.
>>> I'd be more inclined to require equivalence or take the intersection.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> I strongly disagree. My vision was to be able to add a capability to the
>> policy by inserting a policy module that enables the capability (and has
>> associated policy). Making them an intersection or equivalence would
>> require one to update every single module just to add a capability (or
>> at least update the base if it is considered authoritative, which I was
>> also trying to avoid).
>>
>
> Joshua - think about it. Let's say I write a policy module based on the
> new peer checks, and my base module was written in terms of the old
> network checks. Now I link them together and get a policy that tells
> the kernel to use the new peer checks. Voila! My base policy breaks
> horrendously.
>
That is why I said the module being inserted would have the associated
policy. I don't believe policyrep is going to have a concept of base so
we'd just be delaying the inevitable by restricting it to base now.
--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.