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Re: [PATCH net-2.6.25] Add packet filtering based on process'ssecurity context.
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel_at_nospam>Date: Sat Nov 24 2007 - 02:14:50 GMT
To: jmorris@namei.org
Hello.
James Morris wrote:
> From memory, one approach under discussion was to add netfilter hooks to
> the transport layer, which could be invoked correctly by each type of
> protocol when the target process is selected.
>
> If this is done for netfilter, then an LSM hook is probably not needed at
> all, as security modules can utilize netfilter hooks directly.
Patrick McHardy says (at http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=118495005800410&w=2 ) "Even with socket filters netfilter doesn't know the final receipient process, that is not known until it calls recvmsg and the data is read, which is too late for netfilter."
> > Precautions: This approach has a side effect which unlikely occurs.
> >
> > If a socket is shared by multiple processes with different policy,
> > the process who should be able to accept this connection
> > will not be able to accept this connection
> > because socket_post_accept() aborts this connection.
> > But if socket_post_accept() doesn't abort this connection,
> > the process who must not be able to accept this connection
> > will repeat accept() forever, which is a worse side effect.
I think this change is needed regardless of whether to use connection filtering or not.
Currently, SELinux doesn't use socket_post_accept().
| * @socket_post_accept:
| * This hook allows a security module to copy security
| * information into the newly created socket's inode.
But if one wants to *copy* security information to accept()ed socket, the location after fd_install() is too late to copy because the userland process can access accept()ed socket's fd whose security information is not copied yet.
Also, if one wants to *assign* security information to accept()ed socket, it might attend memory allocation which can fail. So, use of void for socket_post_accept() deprives a security module of a chance to abort this connection if the security module failed to *assign* security information.
Regards.
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