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> AppArmor's Overall Design
> AppArmor protects systems from vulnerable software by confining
> processes, giving them "least privilege" access to the system's
> resources: with least privilege, processes are allowed exactly what they
> need, nothing more, and nothing less. Systems are thus protected from
> bugs in applications that would lead to privilege escalation, such as
> remote system access because of a buffer overflow in a web server, etc.
> AppArmor does this by defining application profiles which list allowed
> accesses, and assigning those profiles to processes. AppArmor does *not*
You can do the same with ptrace. If that's not fast enough... improve ptrace?
> The corollary to this is that attacks against AppArmor that start with
> "assume some unconfined process does ..." are outside the AppArmor
> threat model. Any process that might do something malicious to an
IOW AppArmor is broken by design. (One reason is: operations by unconfined processes that did not use to be security sensitive before -- ln shadow random_name -- are security sensitive now.)
Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to email@example.com More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html