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ipsec: Re: [IPsec] [ipsecme] #112: Truncation of SHA-1 ICVs

Re: [IPsec] [ipsecme] #112: Truncation of SHA-1 ICVs

From: Frankel, Sheila E. <sheila.frankel_at_nospam>
Date: Tue Oct 27 2009 - 15:43:56 GMT
To: "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>

#112: Truncation of SHA-1 ICVs

Proposed change to Roadmap doc:

Add text to Section 5.3 (Integrity-Protection Algorithms)

Current text:

   The integrity-protection algorithm RFCs describe how to use these    algorithms to authenticate IKE and/or IPsec traffic, providing    integrity protection to the traffic. This protection is provided by    computing an Integrity Check Value (ICV), which is sent in the    packet. The RFCs describe any special constraints, requirements, or    changes to packet format appropriate for the specific algorithm. In    general, they do not describe the detailed algorithmic computations;    the reference section of each RFC includes pointers to documents that    define the inner workings of the algorithm. Some of the RFCs include    sample test data, to enable implementors to compare their results    with standardized output.

Additional text:

   Some of these algorithms generate a fixed-length ICV, which is truncated    when it is included in an IPsec-protected packet. For example, standard    HMAC-SHA-1 generates a 160-bit ICV, which is truncated to 96 bits when it    is used to provide integrity-protection to an ESP or AH packet. The    individual RFC descriptions mention those algorithms that are truncated.    When these algorithms are used to protect IKEv1 SAs, they are not    truncated. For HMAC-SHA-1 and HMAC-MD5, the IKEv2 IANA registry contains    values for both the truncated version and the standard non-truncated    version; thus, IKEv2 has the capability to negotiate either version to    protect IKEv2 and/or IPsec-v3 SAs. For the other algorithms (AES-XCBC,    HMAC-SHA-256/384/512, AES-CMAC and HMAC-RIPEMD), only the truncated    version can be used for both IKEv2 and IPsec-v3 SAs.  

NOTE to Tero, Paul, Yaron: do we want to expand the IKEv2 IANA registry to include non-truncated AES-XCBC-MAC, HMAC-SHA-256/384/512, AES-CMAC and HMAC-RIPEMD?



From: ipsecme issue tracker [trac@tools.ietf.org] Sent: Friday, October 16, 2009 8:25 PM
To: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org; Frankel, Sheila E. Subject: [ipsecme] #112: Truncation of SHA-1 ICVs

#112: Truncation of SHA-1 ICVs
-----------------------------------+---------------------------------------- Reporter: paul.hoffman@ | Owner: sheila.frankel@ Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: roadmap | Severity: - Keywords: | -----------------------------------+----------------------------------------  In RFC 2404, it mentions that SHA-1 ICVs are truncated to 96 bits for  IPsec. We should also mention in Section 5.3 that this truncation is done  for IKEv2 as well. Same for RFC 2403. Text is needed. -- Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/ipsecme/trac/ticket/112> ipsecme <http://tools.ietf.org/ipsecme/> _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec