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ipsec: Re: [IPsec] Fwd: Last Call: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resu

Re: [IPsec] Fwd: Last Call: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption (IKEv2 Session Resumption) to Proposed Standard

From: Peny Yang <peng.yang.chn_at_nospam>
Date: Thu Sep 03 2009 - 13:57:31 GMT
To: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf@checkpoint.com>

Hi, Yaron:

Please check my response inlines:


2009/9/3 Yaron Sheffer <yaronf@checkpoint.com>:
> Hi Peny,
> Thank you for reviewing this draft. Please see my comments below.
> Regards,
> Yaron
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ipsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>> Peny Yang
>> Sent: Wednesday, September 02, 2009 17:18
>> To: ietf@ietf.org
>> Cc: IPsecme WG
>> Subject: [IPsec] Fwd: Last Call: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption
>> (IKEv2 Session Resumption) to Proposed Standard
>> Sorry, I should cc IPsec mail list. Comments are sent again.
>> Hi, floks:
>> I have two comments on the draft of IKEv2 Session Resumption:
>> 1) Sorry, I have to talk about my concern on the new
>> IKE_SESSION_RESUME. In WG last call, actually I made this comment.
>> However, no feedback was given, maybe because my comment was a little
>> late for WG last call. So, I just copy it here again as a comment for
>> IESG last call.
>> Well, we've discussed pros and cons of IKE_SA_INIT and
>> IKE_SESSION_RESUME for quite a long time. However, IMHO, the consensus
>> is still not fully achieved on this item. So far, I still prefer to
>> choosing extended IKE_SA_INIT for ticket presenting. This solution is
>> specified in http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-xu-ike-sa-sync-01
>> As a summary, the virtues are as follows:
>> - RFC5077 (TLS session resumption) also uses the similar scheme, which
>> extends the message of clienthello with session ticket extension. The
>> extended IKE_SA_INIT solution has the similar way. It's easy to extend
>> the base IKEv2 protocol stack to support session resumption.
>> - Considering the case of failing session resumption, the extended
>> IKE_SA_INIT solution can save one round trip.
>> - As indicated in 4.3.3 IKE_AUTH exchange, IKE_AUTH must be initiated
>> after IKE_SESSION_RESUME. In this sense, the extended IKE_SA_INIT way
>> need less code to be supported compared with IKE_SESSION_RESUME.
>> The down side:
>> - some people thought the way of extended IKE_SA_INIT will make the
>> base IKEv2 protocol stack more complex. IMHO, it's an issue of
>> implementation.
>> Again, I still support to use extended IKE_SA_INIT for ticket
>> presenting instead of IKE_SESSION_RESUME.

> [YS] I see the merits of extending IKE_SA_INIT to support resumption, and in
> fact an early version of our work did exactly that. But the working group
> gave us a clear direction to use a separate exchange
>, and this is where we
> disagree: I believe we did have a strong WG consensus that the
> implementation benefits of having a separate exchange (i.e.) outweigh the benefits of the
> alternative.

[Peny] I know WG chair have the right to judge "rough consensus". However, I can't agree that IPsecme WG has achieved the so called "strong consensus" on this issue. Maybe IESG can further judge it. I also can't agree "benefits of having a separate exchange outweigh the benefits of the alternative". Actually, we didn't achieve consensus on it yet.

> not overloading even more the non-trivial IKE_SA_INIT exchange
[Peny] I am sorry. I just can't see any evidence that the solution of extending IKE_SA_INIT extension will *OVERLOAD* current IKE_SA_INIT exchange? Or I missed something?

>> 2) Maybe I missed some discussions.
>> There is the case: responder may receives a ticket for an IKE SA that
>> is still active and if the responder accepts it. In one of previous
>> versions of this draft, there once was some description on this case.
> [YS] I believe you are referring to the text now in Sec. 4.3.4.
[Peny] OK. This is the part I referred to. But, it can't deal with the issue when IPsec client *continuously* believes failure of gateway.

>> I know that how a client detects the need for resumption is out of the
>> scope of this draft. But, there is the possibility that IPsec client
>> may be continuously deceived and believe the fail of IPsec gateway. It
>> may continuously present the ticket and update the ticket. In this
>> sense, IMHO, this draft should take care of this case.
> [YS] If I understand the scenario correctly, it is similar to an attacker
> repeatedly sending notifications to an IKE client, making it believe that
> the IKE exchange has failed and needs to be reinitiated.
[Peny] Well, this case may not cause this problem. If attacker has IPsec connection with the client, the client will only believe the attacker fails, not Gateway.
Here is one of the cases. Sometimes, temporary unavailability of network access may also cause this problem. For example, in mobile network, mobile terminals may lose radio resources in some time. In this situation, all the packets outward of client will be timeout. Then IKEv2 protocol stack has the possibility to believe failure of gateway. It will send one or more message to initiate the session resumption. However, as far as I know, many cellular card now will not discard the packets when radio resources lose for a while. It will buffer the packets and send them out when radio resources are available.

> This attack against
> plain-vanilla IKE would be much more CPU-intensive to the client and to the
> (real) gateway, compared to repeated session resumption.
[Peny] Well, I see your logic. Basically, even if gateway may not be overloaded, it does not mean gateway will do something in vain.

> Even when you
> factor in the cost of generating a new ticket. Moreover, the regular IKEv2
> anti-DOS cookie mechanism is supported by IKE_SESSION_RESUME as well.
[Peny] I did not mean this. Sorry for some confusing.

>> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 10:09 PM, The IESG<iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:
>> > The IESG has received a request from the IP Security Maintenance and
>> > Extensions WG (ipsecme) to consider the following document:
>> >
>> > - 'IKEv2 Session Resumption '
>> > <draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption-07.txt> as a Proposed Standard
>> >
>> > The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
>> > final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
>> > ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2009-09-14. Exceptionally,
>> > comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please
>> > retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>> >
>> > The file can be obtained via
>> > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption-
>> 07.txt
>> >
>> >
>> > IESG discussion can be tracked via
>> >
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=view_id&dTag=17
>> 990&rfc_flag=0
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
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>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>> >
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