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full-disclosure-uk: Re: [Full-disclosure] Exploitation of unused

Re: [Full-disclosure] Exploitation of unused IPv6-capabilities

From: TJ <trejrco_at_nospam>
Date: Sun Jan 25 2009 - 12:51:36 GMT
To: <full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk>


Indeed, that is one of the reasons a feature like "RA Guard" is sorely needed ... http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-01

/TJ

>-----Original Message-----
>From: full-disclosure-bounces@lists.grok.org.uk [mailto:full-disclosure-
>bounces@lists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
>Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 11:48 AM
>To: Lukas Th. Hey
>Cc: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
>Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Exploitation of unused IPv6-capabilities
>
>On Sun, 18 Jan 2009 22:17:44 +0100, "Lukas Th. Hey" said:
>
>> Attack: Have an IPv6 tunnel with appropriate prefix
delegated.
>> Configure your machine to propagate the prefix and
>> switch on IPv6 routing.
>
>Yes, that attack unfortunately often works quite well. It's been known
>about for quite some time though. Read section 7 of RFC5006, which
>specifically mentions rogue RAs for redirection. It also adds:
>
> Also, an attacker could configure a host to send out
> an RA with a fraudulent RDNSS address, which is presumably an easier
> avenue of attack than becoming a rogue router and having to process
> all traffic for the subnet. It is necessary to disable the RA RDNSS
> option in both routers and clients administratively to avoid this
> problem. All of this can be done independently of implementing ND.
>
>And having a rogue RA has been a known issue since at least 2004:
>
>http://www.atm.tut.fi/list-archive/ipng/msg13311.html
>
>(Probably further back, but I'll let somebody else chase down the first
>citation)
>



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