full-disclosure-uk August 2008 archive
Main Archive Page > Month Archives  > full-disclosure-uk archives
full-disclosure-uk: [Full-disclosure] [IVIZ-08-007] DriveCrypt S

[Full-disclosure] [IVIZ-08-007] DriveCrypt Security Model bypass exploiting wrong BIOS API usage

From: iViZ Security Advisories <advisories_at_nospam>
Date: Mon Aug 25 2008 - 09:13:23 GMT
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com, full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

  • ----------------------------------------------------------------------- [ iViZ Security Advisory 08-007 25/08/2008 ]
  • ----------------------------------------------------------------------- iViZ Techno Solutions Pvt. Ltd. http://www.ivizsecurity.com
  • -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    • Title: DriveCrypt Security Model bypass exploiting wrong BIOS API usage
    • Date: 25/08/2008
    • Software: DriveCrypt
  • --[ Synopsis:

    The password checking routine of DriveCrypt fails to sanitize the     BIOS keyboard buffer before AND after reading passwords.

  • --[ Affected Software:
    • Secu Star's DriveCrypt Plus Pack v3.9 (possibly other versions also)
  • --[ Technical description:

    DriveCrypt's pre-boot authentication routines use the BIOS API to     read user input via the keyboard. The BIOS internally copies the     keystrokes in a RAM structure called the BIOS Keyboard buffer     inside the BIOS Data Area. This buffer is not flushed after use,     resulting in potential plain text password leakage once the OS     is fully booted, assuming the attacker can read the password at     physical memory location 0x40:0x1e. It is also possible for a root     user to reboot the computer by instrumenting the BIOS keyboard     buffer in spite of the full disk encryption.

  • --[ Impact:
    1. Plain text password disclosure. Required privileges to perform this operation are OS dependant, from unprivileged users under Windows (any), to root under most Unix.
    2. A privileged attacker able to write to the MBR and knowing the password (for instance thanks to 1), is able to reboot the computer in spite of the password prompted at boot time (and in spite of disk encryption) by initializing the BIOS keybaord buffer with the correct password (using an intermediary bootloader that will in turn run DriveCrypt).
  • --[ Full Technical Whitepaper

    http://www.ivizsecurity.com/research/preboot/preboot_whitepaper.pdf

  • --[ Vendor response:
    • No Response from vendor in spite of multiple solicitations.
  • --[ Credits:

    This vulnerability was discovered by Security Researcher     Jonathan Brossard from iViZ Techno Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

  • --[ Disclosure timeline:
    • First private disclosure to vendor on July 15th 2008
    • First Public disclosure at Defcon 16 on August 10th 2008
  • --[ Reference:

    http://www.ivizsecurity.com/security-advisory.html

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32)

iD8DBQFIsnewkcchhz1mT/IRAt67AJ9HICVN+7/BmxWyZaFcrvFlXCHMeQCg1GGU ydFJNRdj6sRvqJbZmzT5r7Y=
=iZpc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/