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> On 8-Aug-08, at 10:11 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
>> It also only fixes this single type of key compromise. Surely it is
>> time to stop ignoring CRLs before something more serious goes wrong?
> Clearly many implementors have chosen to *knowingly* ignore CRLs
> despite the security implications
Please note that Firefox 3 implements OCSP checking which is turned on by default. It's more efficient than CRLs...in that respect also note that some CAs don't support CRL distribution points in the end user certificates nor OCSP at all. Obviously those are details a subscriber should check before purchasing a certificate.
Also subscribers share the responsibilities with the CA in cases such as the Debian fiasco, most CAs have refrained from detecting and revoking affected certificates. Just to make it clear that this problem isn't specific to OpenID but all web sites and we discussed this issue extensively over at Mozilla (dev.tech.crypto).
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