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*cough* http://codefromthe70s.org/sslblacklist.asp *cough* -- Dan Guido On Fri, Aug 8, 2008 at 12:57 PM, Eric Rescorla <email@example.com> wrote:
> At Fri, 8 Aug 2008 17:31:15 +0100,
> Dave Korn wrote:
>> >> Eric Rescorla wrote on 08 August 2008 16:06: >> >> > At Fri, 8 Aug 2008 11:50:59 +0100, >> > Ben Laurie wrote: >> >> However, since the CRLs will almost certainly not be checked, this >> >> means the site will still be vulnerable to attack for the lifetime of >> >> the certificate (and perhaps beyond, depending on user >> >> behaviour). Note that shutting down the site DOES NOT prevent the attack. >> >> >> >> Therefore mitigation falls to other parties. >> >> >> >> 1. Browsers must check CRLs by default. >> > >> > Isn't this a good argument for blacklisting the keys on the client >> > side? >> >> Isn't that exactly what "Browsers must check CRLs" means in this context >> anyway? What alternative client-side blacklisting mechanism do you suggest? >
> It's easy to compute all the public keys that will be generated
> by the broken PRNG. The clients could embed that list and refuse
> to accept any certificate containing one of them. So, this
> is distinct from CRLs in that it doesn't require knowing
> which servers have which cert...
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> _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/