full-disclosure-uk August 2008 archive
Main Archive Page > Month Archives  > full-disclosure-uk archives
full-disclosure-uk: Re: [Full-disclosure] OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS

Re: [Full-disclosure] OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory

From: Dave Korn <dave.korn_at_nospam>
Date: Fri Aug 08 2008 - 16:31:15 GMT
To: "'Eric Rescorla'" <ekr@networkresonance.com>, "'Ben Laurie'" <benl@google.com>


Eric Rescorla wrote on 08 August 2008 16:06: > At Fri, 8 Aug 2008 11:50:59 +0100, > Ben Laurie wrote:
>> However, since the CRLs will almost certainly not be checked, this
>> means the site will still be vulnerable to attack for the lifetime of
>> the certificate (and perhaps beyond, depending on user
>> behaviour). Note that shutting down the site DOES NOT prevent the attack.
>>
>> Therefore mitigation falls to other parties.
>>
>> 1. Browsers must check CRLs by default.
> > Isn't this a good argument for blacklisting the keys on the client > side?

  Isn't that exactly what "Browsers must check CRLs" means in this context anyway? What alternative client-side blacklisting mechanism do you suggest?

    cheers,
      DaveK -- Can't think of a witty .sigline today.... _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/