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On 08/19/2010 05:47 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> It prevents the client application from directly communicating with the
> top-level Xorg server. In the case of the bug you cited, they have to
> first escalate access and gain code execution within Xephyr before they
> can mount the attack on the top-level Xorg server, rather than being
> able to directly attack the top-level Xorg server from the client app.
I see. I thought Xephyr and the sandboxed program run within the same
domain, but looking at the process table made it clear.
The logical next question would be: How confined is xserver_t actually? ;)
> Curious as to whether they in fact wrote a successful exploit that did
> that, or just pointed out that it is theoretically possible.
I was also curious and asked on their blog, but didn't get a response.
thanks for your explanations,
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